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Abstract : The results show that managerial ownership and institutional ownership have negative and 
significant effects toward debt policy and company values, while debt policy have a positive and significant 
effects toward debt policy and company values. This phenomenon shows that shareholders from management 
and shareholders from institutional assess rhat debt policy may harm their position in the company, and 
will not give any benefit materially, it is because of Interest expense that cannot fully deduct the taxable 
income. Meanwhile, the debt policy is considered as positive signal of a business project that the company 
wants or works on, therefore the company needs a lot of funds. On the other hand, the composition of stocks 
ownership dominated by management and institutional shareholders is regarded as a threat in society, due to 
the opportunity to benefit themselves but will not benefit the society. In the end, information asymmetry still 
becomes a problem between individual and small shareholders, with shareholders that able to obtain important 
company informations such as institutional shareholders and shareholders who also take control the company 
management.
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IntroduCtIon
Based on financial management point of view, one of the objectives from the company’s 
existence is to achieve the prosperity of shareholders or owners, that can be demonstrated 
through the increasing value of the company (Cheung, Chung, & Fung, 2015; Fred. J Weston 
& Brigham, 1994). However, there are various conflicts in the process, including conflicts in 
the internal of the company such as conflicts between managers and shareholders or between 
the shareholders and creditors, which is basically it is caused by agency relationship. Agency 
relationship deals with an agreement or contract in which one of the parties is more dominant 
or has authority in influencing the company’s decision, so that the decision give benefits to the 
party (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Rünger, 2014).
In maximizing shareholder prosperity, most financiers are more likely to hand over the 
business and the company management to professionals (in this case managers), who understand 
the good corporate management strategy (Alfaraih, Alanezi, & Almujamed, 2012). Managers, 
with their authority, are required to work for the company and maximize the company value so 
that the welfare of the company can be achieved. In addition, managers are also required to make 
a profit which will then be distributed to the shareholders as dividend (Sucuahi & Cambarihan, 
2016). On the other hand, through authority and direct involvement, the manager may make 
decisions which can give benefit to himself even if it will sacrifice the interests of the shareholders. 
It is called conflicts in the agency relationship (agency conflict) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
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This can occur due to asymmetry information between managers and the owner of the 
company, that is the imbalance of information known by the two parties (Rizqia, Aisjah, & 
Sumiati, 2013). Thus, the managers’ decisions are probably the decisions which give benefit to 
them, such as improving the status and salary.
As the result of agency issues, there will be a cost to reduce the conflict, called agency 
cost (Jensen, 1986). Agency cost is an expense uses to supervise the movement of managers by 
shareholders. Efforts to reduce the agency cost can be done by several approaches, one of them is 
increasing managerial ownership so that the interests of management and shareholders are more 
aligned, because the manager know that the shareholder’s position, that the wrong decisions may 
cause company’s losses. (Hasnawati & Sawir, 2015; Indra E. Tjeleni, 2013; Murtiningtyas, 2012). 
Efforts to increase supervision mechanisms from external parties can also be done by 
activating the monitoring through institutional ownership (Hasnawati & Sawir, 2015; Indra 
E. Tjeleni, 2013; Listyani, 2003; Murtiningtyas, 2012; Velury & Jenkins, 2006). Institutional 
ownership will trigger the emergence of more optimized manager performance. Companies 
that have large institutional ownership structures demonstrate their dominance in monitoring 
management performance. The greater institutional ownership structure, the utilization of 
company assets can be more efficient, so that it can prevent the wasteful behavior by management 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Nix & Chen, 2013). 
The phenomenon of Indonesia’s manufacturing industry development demonstrates a 
bright prospects in the future. Thus requires an efficient mechanism to minimize the agency 
conflicts among shareholders. One of the mechanism is through the structure of shareholder by 
internal and external parties. However, the dominant managerial ownership can also threaten 
other shareholders because the external management will have difficulties in controlling the 
manager’s performance. (Wahidahwati, 2002). While the institutional ownership is considered 
incapable in minimizing agency conflicts and maintaining the company value (Mokhtari & 
Makerani, 2013). This is contrary to the previous explanation where managerial ownership 
and institutional ownership are deemed to minimize agency conflicts which can increase the 
company value in the market. 
The use of debt makes the company have responsibility for periodic loan installments, 
where it can control the free cash flow, and prevent the manager from doing waste actions, 
and triggers managers to look for the most profitable investments or businesses. Increasing the 
source of funds derived from debt can also minimize the agency cost (Baker & Martin, 2011, 
pp. 18–19; Putu Anom Mahadwartha & Jogiyanto Hartono, 2002). It can reduce the desire 
of managers to use cash flow for activities that are not optimal. Thus the existence of debt is 
considered to be able to control the role of managerial ownership which can maintain the good 
value of the company. The debt policy intervention and the impact of ownership structures on 
the increase of company value are the hypotheses in this research.
lIterature reVIew
Company Value 
Company value is a certain condition that has been achieved by a company as a 
representation of community’s trust in the company after a few years of process, since the 
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company was established to present. The community’s trust can be seen by their willing to buy 
shares of the company at a certain price according to their perception and belief. The increase 
company value is an achievement, as the wishes of the owners, because by the increase company 
value, the prosperity of the owners will also increase, and this is the duty of the manager as an 
agent that has been trusted by the company owners to run the company (Riyanto, 2008). The 
company value is very important because with the high company value, it will be followed 
by the high prosperity of shareholders (Brigham, Gapenski, & Brigham, 1997; Martin-Reyna 
& Durán-Encalada, 2012). The higher stock price, the higher company value. The wealth of 
shareholders and companies is presented by the stock market price which also a reflection of 
the investment decision, financing, and asset management. The company value in this reseach 
used price book value which illustrates how much the market appreciates the stock book of a 
company. Companies that run well, generally have the ratio of price book value above one, 
which reflects the stock market price is greater than the value of the book. The high price book 
value reflects the prosperity of the shareholders, where prosperity for shareholders is the main 
goal of the company (Weston & Brigham, 1977). 
ownership structure
managerial ownership
Managerial in a company is a party that is active in making decision to run the company. 
The parties are those who sit on the commissioners board, and the directors board of the company. 
The existence of managers have different backgrounds, such as representing the shareholders 
institutional, professional personnel appointed by shareholders in the GMS (General Meeting 
of Shareholders), those who sit in line with the management of the company because they also 
have shares. The managerial ownership structure is the proportion of ordinary shares owned by 
management. With managerial ownership, the manager will directly feel the impact of every 
decision taken including in determining the company’s debt policy (Hasnawati & Sawir, 2015; 
Indra E. Tjeleni, 2013; Murtiningtyas, 2012). The increase of managerial ownership will make 
personal wealth management increasingly tied to the company’s wealth so that management will 
strive to reduce the risk of wealth loss. With the increase of managerial ownership percentage, 
the manager is motivated to improve performance and responsible to increase the prosperity of 
shareholders.
Institutional ownership
The level of shareholding by a fairly high managerial can give bad effect on the 
company (Wahidahwati, 2002). This is because the manager has a great voting right for their 
very high ownership, so they have a strong position to control the company. As a result, external 
shareholders will have difficulty to control the manager’s actions.
In order to overcome the weakness above, it is advisable to have a supervisory 
mechanism within the company. One of the mechanisms is by enabling monitoring through 
institutional investors (Hasnawati & Sawir, 2015; Indra E. Tjeleni, 2013; Listyani, 2003; 
Murtiningtyas, 2012; Velury & Jenkins, 2006). Institutional ownership is the ownership of 
shares by institutional parties such as banks, insurance companies, investment company and 
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other institutions (Wahidahwati, 2002). With institutional ownership by investment companies, 
banks, insurance companies and other institutions, the company will encourage the emergence 
of more optimal supervision towards manager’s performance (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Nix & 
Chen, 2013).  Institutional ownership is important in supervising the behavior of managers, so 
managers are more cautious in decision making.
Funding decisions
In an effort to manage and run the company’s activities, the manager needs funds 
for its business expansion activities. The funding sources can be obtained from internal and 
external capital. Internal capital derived from retained earnings while external capital from the 
company’s capital or debt. 
The use of debt-with interest has its advantages and weaknesses. The advantages of 
debt use for companies include:
1. Interest expense reduces tax expense.
2. Creditors only get relatively fixed interest so that excess profit is a claim for the company 
owner.
3. Creditors have no voting rights so the owner can control the company with smaller funds.
The use of debt also has a weakness because the higher debt will increases the risk and 
if the company is not good, the operating income will be low and not enough to cover the cost 
of interest so the owner’s wealth will be reduced. In extreme conditions, such losses can harm 
the company because it can be threatened by bankruptcy (Adenugba, Ige, & Kesinro, 2016; 
Rahim, Yaacob, Alias, & Nor, 2010).
On the other hand, debt can be used as one of the supervision tools in controlling agency 
conflicts. Companies with great free cash flow encourage managers to do waste and use them 
for personal interests. Debt will lower the cash flows, and it lowers the chances of management 
in making waste. Debt policy also causes the company to be monitored by the creditors. Strict 
supervision within the company will cause the manager to act in accordance with the interests 
of the creditor or shareholder. Therefore, the company should look for a balance point so that 
the use of debt can be done optimally so that losses suffered by the creditors, managers and 
shareholders can be reduced as minimum as possible (Alonso, De, Iturriaga, & Rodryguez, 
2005; Altan & Arkan, 2011; Baker & Martin, 2011; Khamis, Salleh, & Nawi, 2012; Obradovich 
& Gill, 2012; Putu Anom Mahadwartha & Jogiyanto Hartono, 2002)
sharia Companies in Indonesia
Indonesia is a country with Muslim as the majority. Therefore, the industrial sector in 
Indonesia try to fulfill the halal business so that the Muslim community in Indonesia can be more 
calm when about to engage with these companies (Rivai, Firmansyah, Veithzal, & Rizqullah, 
2010). In general, the application of Islamic sharia principles in the capital market industry, 
especially on stock instruments, is based on the assessment of shares issued by each company. 
The fiqh experts argued that stock can be categorized fulfill the sharia principles if the 
company activities do not include things that are prohibited in Islamic rules, such as: alcohol, 
gambling, the production with pigs as the raw material, pornography, conventional financial 
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services, and conventional insurance (Rivai et al., 2010, p. 534). So that in 2007 Indonesian 
Market and Financial Institution Supervisory Agency (BAPEPAM) started to publish Sharia 
Effect List (DES) which contains of companies list in Indonesia according to sharia principles 
(Indonesia Stock Exchange, 2015). The Sharia effect list is keep updated by Financial Sercive 
Authority (OJK).
The criteria that must be fulfilled by issuers in order to enter the Sharia Effect List are 
as follows (Financial Ferivices Authority, 2014):
1. The business activities are not in contradiction with sharia principles as regulated in 
IX.A.13, for not conducting business activities as follows
a. Gambling and games related with gambling.
b. Trading without service/goods delivery.
c. Trading with fake offer/request 
d. Bank with interest based.
e. Financial companies with interest based.
f. Trading which contains uncertainty elements (gharar) and / or gambling (masyir), 
including conventional insurance.
g. Producing, distributing, selling and/or provide harem goods/revice (harem li-
dzatihi), harem goods or service not because of the substance (haram li-ghairihi) 
determined by DSN-MUI; and / or, goods or services that are morally harmful.
h. Conducting transaction with bribe elements (risywah).
2. The total of debt ration with interest based compared to the total of equity can not 
exceed 45%. 
3. The ratio of total interest income and other non-halal income compared to the business 
income and other income for no more than 10 %.
The higher starndardized of sharia companies makes small possibility of a bad company 
performance.  Moreover, if the authority ownership in the company is also dominated by parties 
that support the implementation of Sharia business. It becomes the basis of a better pattern 
possibility in sharia companies compared to conventional companies, including manufacturing 
companies. Thus, this research is about to involve “sharia” as a controlling variable towards 
company policy and values.
research Framework
One of the funding sources comes from debt. The use of debt can reduce excess 
cashflow within the company and reduce agency conflicts. By debt, the company must make 
periodic payments on the interest and basic loans (Baker & Martin, 2011, pp. 18–19; Putu 
Anom Mahadwartha & Jogiyanto Hartono, 2002). This can reduce the desire of managers to 
use cash flow for activities that are not optimal.
Efforts to reduce the agency cost can be done by increasing managerial ownership and 
institutional ownership. Managerial ownership causes managers to be cautious in using debt 
and to avoid opportunistic behaviour because managers also suffer the consequences of high 
interest costs and managers tend not to dislike risk (Weston & Brigham, 1977). The increase of 
managerial ownership, will reduce the use of debt by the company.
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The presence of institutional investors will drive to more optimal supervision towards 
management performance (Swandari, 2006). An effective supervision by institutional will lead 
to decrease of debt use due to the role of debt as one of the supervision equipment that has been 
taken over by foreign institutional. 
Based on the explanation above the research model can be described as follows:
 
6 
 
 
Figure 1. Research Framework  
Research Hypotheses 
Referring to the problem formulation, the theories and some previous studies, so the 
hypotheses that will be tested in this study are: 
H1 : Managerial ownership positively influenced the company value  
H2 : Institutional ownership positively influenced the company value  
H3 : Managerial ownership negatively influenced the debt policy  
H4 : Institutional ownership positively influenced the debt policy  
H5 : The debt policy influences the company value 
METHOD 
The object of this research focused on manufacturing companies in Indonesia. The analysis 
process used samples of manufacturing companies in Indonesia listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) from 2012 to 2016. Samples in the research at least have qualified to publish 
the full annual financial report as well as the needs of research, as a source of research data 
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Company Value. The company value in this research is measured by the PBV (price book 
value) as the market ratio used to measure the performance of the stock market price towards 
book value:
PBV = Stock price / Price book value
Managerial Ownership. Managerial ownership is a measure of the stock percentage owned 
by the directors board, management, commissioners or any party which directly involve in the 
decision making of the company.
Institutional Ownership, The proportion of shares owned by the institution at the end of 
the year measured in %. This variable represents the level of stock ownership by domestic 
institutions within the company.
Funding Policy. Funding policy variable is assessed by using debt to equity ratio (DER) 
indicator, a financial ratio that compares the company’s total debt to total capital, with a formula 
(Obradovich & Gill, 2012):
Debt to Equity Ratio = Total debt / Total equity
analysis technique
Model uses data regression panel (Ghozali & Ratmono, 2013). Analysis begins 
with determining the first and second regression models (Widarjono, 2009, p. 231), then 
followed by classic assumption test for panel data, then conduct hypotheses test using t-test 
and influence test indirectly using sobel test. The equation formula on the first and second 
models is as follows.
Model I : 
Y1 = α + β1 X1 + β2 X2 + β3 X3 + ε1   or  
DER = β1 d_sharia + β2 MAN + β3 INST + ε1
Model II :
Y2 = α + β4 X1+  β5 X2 + β6 X3 + β7 Y1 + ε2  or 
PBV = β4 d_sharia + β5 MAN + β6 INST + β7 DER + ε2
result 
descriptive statistics analysis
This research uses annual financial report data of manufacturing companies in 
Indonesia from 2012 to 2016. The data is based on the completeness of financial statements 
published by each company. So the total data obtained is 119 companies for 5 periods (n 
= 595 data). From the collection of 119 data for 5 periods, it can be conducted a simple 
analysis, which is a descriptive statistical analysis. Descriptive data processing results can 
be seen in table 1.
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Table 1. Descriptive Analysis
PBV DER MNJ INST
 Mean  2.451529  1.047779  4.660156  70.35538
 Median  0.931766  0.865051  0.001000  75.00000
 Maximum  62.93107  70.83159  89.44444  98.95830
 Minimum -9.027196 -31.78137  0.000000  0.000000
 Std. Dev.  6.463365  4.342721  13.10778  20.73299
 Skewness  6.276585  5.077003  4.239096 -1.158233
 Kurtosis  47.73852  130.9569  22.56812  4.880236
 Sum  1458.660  623.4286  2772.793  41861.45
 Sum Sq. Dev.  24814.40  11202.38  102057.4  255334.9
 Observations  595  595  595  595
         Source: Output Eviews
According to table 1, it can be known that manufacturing companies mostly have price 
to book value under the value of the book. It is shown from the middle value of the stock price 
ratio per book value of 0.9317 while the average value is 2.4515. The spread can also indicate 
that there are several companies that have a high reputation among the community, the sample 
of this research also companies that have a lower share value than the book value.
The same thing also occurs in the debt ratio towards capital, but there is a big difference. 
The average value of debt ratio is 1.0477, while the middle value is lower than the average 
value of 0.865. For the management ownership factor, almost all companies have shareholders 
who are also part of the company’s managerial. Nevertheless their ownership is very small, and 
only a small part of the company whose management is also a shareholder. The institutional 
ownership conditions of manufacturing companies have different conditions. It is shown 
from the middle value of institutional ownership ratio is greater than the average value. In 
other words, the majority of manufacturing companies have a capital structure dominated by 
institutional shareholders.
This can be understood because the development of manufacturing industry in 
Indonesia has a great opportunity in the coming era. So that other companies who realize the 
potential prefer the manufacturing stock as the allocation of their excess funds. Moreover, 
the investment decision of other companies has been based on the analysis and consideration 
of financial experts of each investor company, where it is convincing that the manufacturing 
sector companies are still a favorite for institutional investor.
dIsCussIon
The hypothesis testing in this study was conducted after the determination of a 
regression equation model and classical assumption test. The regression equation model 
has been determined to use Fixed Effect Model (FEM) after passing through Chow Test and 
Hausman Test. While this research panel data has also fulfilled the classical assumption test in 
the form of multicolinearity test and heteroscedasticity. The research data is processed using 
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the help of Eviews 10 program. The hypotheses result is divided into table 2. For the first 
regression, and in table 3 for second regression.
Tabel 2. The Fit Model of First Regression
Dependent Variable: DER
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Sample: 2012 2016
Periods included: 5
Cross-sections included: 119
Total panel (balanced) observations: 595
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.744713 0.062242 11.96488 0.0000
MNJ 0.004263 0.001602 2.661437 0.0080
INST 0.006528 0.000865 7.551350 0.0000
D_SHARIA -0.619098 0.027257 -22.71363 0.0000
          Note: (significance of 10% or 0.1)
Tabel 3. The Fit Model of Second Regression
Dependent Variable: PBV
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample: 2012 2016
Periods included: 5
Cross-sections included: 119
Total panel (balanced) observations: 595
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 1.563727 1.293812 1.208620 0.2273
DER 0.203430 0.060614 3.356169 0.0008
MNJ -0.025808 0.026419 -0.976888 0.3290
INST 0.004629 0.016659 0.277888 0.7812
D_SHARIA 1.163291 0.537850 2.162856 0.0310
          Note: (significance of 10% or 0.1)
managerial ownership towards Company Value
Table 3. shows the existence of managerial ownership relationship (MNJ) on the 
company value (PBV), with negative influence of regression coefficient for -0.025808. This 
indicates that small managerial holdings will be able to increase the company value. In other 
words, companies that are not dominated by shareholders who are also a manager will be 
assessed better. in the market.
Manufacturing company is a company that has  a large prospects of business development 
in Indonesia, because Indonesia is a developing country with a very high population. It makes 
the consumer market becomes very tempting, not only for investors and prospective investors, 
but also for management. With the double power of management that is also the owner of 
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the shares, it is feared, will make the company policy not be able to favoring the interests of 
investors or individuals or small shareholders. The results of this research are not in accordance 
with the hypotheses, because the the influence of managerial ownership is not appropriate to 
the hypothesis (negative). In other words, hypothesis 1 is rejected.
Managerial ownership that is too dominant can also threaten other shareholders because 
external parties management will have difficulty in controlling the managers performance 
(Sukirni, 2012; Wahidahwati, 2002)
Institutional ownership towards Company Value 
According to table 3, it can be known that institutional ownership is able to influence 
the company value. It complies the hypothesis research which stated that by institutional 
ownership, the company value will also increase. In the other words Hypothesis 2 is rejected 
because the influence is not significant. 
The existence of ownership by institutional is essentially showed the interest of large 
and professional investors  toward compan, where it gives a good signal that the company have 
a good and profitable performance also business opportunity in the future. Moreover, company 
with bigger institutional stocks (5%) indicates the ability to monitor the management. The higher 
institutional ownership, the more efficient company active utilization. Hence, the proportion 
of institutional ownership can be categorized as prevention in the wastage by management 
(Alfaraih et al., 2012; Jung & Kwon, 2002). The positive and significant relationship also 
in accordance with the previous research (Hasnawati & Sawir, 2015; Indra E. Tjeleni, 2013; 
Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Listyani, 2003; Murtiningtyas, 2012; Nix & Chen, 2013; Velury & 
Jenkins, 2006).
managerial ownership towards debt policy 
The third hypothesis test refers to the first regression results presented in table 2. Based 
on the table 2, it is revealed that the existence of management that also has shares in related 
companies tends to want a higher debt policy. It is in accordance with the hypothesis on this 
research, also in accordance with previous research (Wahidahwati, 2002). Therefore it can be 
said the hypothesis 3 is rejected. 
Overuse of debt as a source of funding will increase risk when the company’s condition 
is not good. As the operating income will be low and not enough to cover the cost of interest, 
it will eventually impact the wealth loss of the owner. In extreme conditions, such losses can 
harm the company because it can be threatened by bankruptcy. Moreover, the burden of debt 
(such as interest) that can be used as a deduction for taxable income has a maximum limit, so 
that too high funding from debt will ultimately harm the company itself. 
Efforts to reduce the agency cost can be conducted by increasing managerial ownership 
and institutional ownership. Managerial ownership causes managers to be cautious in using 
debt and to avoid opportunistic behaviour because managers also suffer the consequences of 
high interest costs and managers tend to dislike risk (Weston & Brigham, 1977). The increase 
of managerial ownership, will reduce the use of debt by the company.
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Institutional ownership towards debt policy 
 According to table 2., it is known that institutional ownership has a positive and 
significant relationship to debt policy. It is not in line with the research hypothesis that 
institutional ownership has a positive influence towards debt policy. Thus, it can be concluded 
that the hypothesis 4 about institutional ownership has a positive influence on debt policy is 
accepted. 
The institutional ownership which support the funding policy from debt strengthen the 
controlling effort which legalized by law in order to control the company, so that it can minimize 
fraud among employees (people in the company). Through the increase number of supervisor 
(in this case is the creditors or lender, such as bank), will improve the quality and accountability 
of company performance, because it is supervised by many parties.
debt policy towards Company Value
Based on table 2, it is revealed that debt policy (DER) has a positive and significant 
influence towards company value. This is in accordance with the research hypothesis stated 
that debt policy affects the company value. In other words, hypothesis 5 is accepted. The 
ability of debt policy in influencing the company value has also been proven by some previous 
researchers (Adenugba et al., 2016; Alonso, De et al., 2005; Altan & Arkan, 2011; Farooq & 
Masood, 2016; Rahim et al., 2010). 
In this research, debt policy can increase the company value (Alonso, De et al., 2005; 
Altan & Arkan, 2011; Farooq & Masood, 2016). Company value is a certain condition that has 
been achieved by a company as a representation of community’s trust to the company after a 
few years of process, since the company was established to present. The increase of company 
value is an achievement, as the wishes of owners, because by the increase of company value, 
the prosperity of the owners will also increase, and this is the manager’s duty as an agent that 
has trusted by the owners of the company to run their companies. (Riyanto, 2008) The company 
value is very important because with the high company value, it will be followed by the high 
prosperity of shareholders (Brigham et al., 1997). The higher stock price, the higher company 
value will be. The company’s wealth and shareholders are presented by market price of the 
shares which are a reflection of the investment decision, financing, and asset management.. 
The increase of company value as a form of positive response to debt policy, can be 
interpreted as public acceptance of the company’s decision to increase debt. It is considered as 
a form of investment or new project undertakes by the company, therefore it requires additional 
capital. With the vision of the company’s business plan with the addition of capital, it will 
increase public interest in the company.
Intervening test or sobel
Direct and indirect influences of independent variables toward the company value are 
analyzed using path analysis, which is re-tested with sobel test. The sobel test is conducted 
twice, in order to test the managerial ownership relationship to the company value through the 
debt policy which is presented in Figure 2, and the institutional ownership relationship to the 
company value through debt policy which is presented in Figure 3. 
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financing, and asset management..  
The increase of company value as a form of positive response to debt policy, can 
be interpreted as public acceptance of the company's decision to increase debt . It is 
considered as a form of investment or new project undertakes by the company, therefore 
it requires additional capital. With the vision of the company's business plan with the 
addition of capital, it will increase public interest in the company. 
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Direct and indirect influences of independent variables toward the company value are 
analyzed using path analysis, which is re-tested with sobel test. The sobel test is conducted 
twice, in order to test the managerial ownership relationship to the company value through 
the debt policy which is presented in Figure 2, and the institutional ownership relationship to 
the company value through debt policy which is presented in Figure 3.  
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the impact of managerial ownership of company value. This indirect relationship is a partial 
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Figure 3 shows that debt policy can be an intermediary for institutional ownership 
impacts towards company values. This indirect relationship is partial, because institutional 
ownership has a direct relationship to the company value.
A debt financing policy is a policy that may affect shareholder capital ownership 
percentage. Thus, in general, the funding decision from a high debt is necessary for the 
consideration of shareholders. In other words, debt policy decisions are influenced by 
institutional ownership, as stockholder who have an ability or a more complete knowledge 
related to investment compared to individual shareholders.
Controlling Variable
Controlling variable in this research is in the form of dummy, to distinguish between 
manufacturing companies in accordance with sharia principles with manufacturing companies 
that in its execution has not been in accordance with sharia principles. In table 2 and 3 indicates that 
this dummy variable has a significant impact on the endogenous variables (the funding policy and 
the company value).  The impact of dummy variables on the funding policy indicates a negative 
relationship, which means a manufacturing company that fulfill the sharia principles tends to 
minimize funding policy through debt. This is in line with one of the terms in sharia company, 
that there is a limit on the use of capital as a debt, as explained in the literature review. The role of 
dummy variable towards company’s value has a positive correlation. It means that the company 
value in accordance with sharia principles is better than the value of conventional manufacturing 
companies (which is not in accordance with sharia principles). Thus, the strengthening of sharia 
companies has better quality and image than conventional manufacturing companies.
ConClusIons
This research gave results that from 5 research hypotheses, only two were accepted. 
The two accepted hypotheses are managerial relationship towards debt policy, and debt policy 
relationship towards company value. Meanwhile the three hypotheses are rejected, because of 
differences in the direction of the hypothesis, with research results. While from the significance 
of correlation, it can be said that managerial and institutional ownership has a significant 
impact on both debt and company value policies, and the debt policy also has significant impact 
towards the company value. The test results of these influences can be concluded.
1. Managerial ownership has negative influence and significant towards company value
2. Institutional ownership has negative influence and significant towards company value
3. Managerial ownership has negative influence and significant towards debt policy
4. Institutional ownership has negative influence and significant towards kebijakan utang
5. Debt policy positive influence and significant towards company value
6. Managerial ownership has influence towards company value with debt policy as 
intermediary
7. Institutional ownership has influence towards company value with debt policy as 
intermediary
8. Manufacturing companies in accordance to sharia principles have better quality 
compared to common manufacturing companies.
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This phenomenon shows that both shareholders from management and shareholders from 
institutional, consider that debt policy can harm their position in the company, and will not 
give the any benefit materially, it is due to Interest expense that cannot fully be the cost of 
taxable income deduction. As a result, the debt policy is considered as positive signal of a 
business project that the company works on, therefore the company needs a lot of funds. On the 
other hand, the composition of stocks ownership dominated by management and institutional 
shareholders is considers as a threat in community, due to the opportunity to benefit themselves 
but will not benefit the community. In the end, information asymmetry is still a problem between 
individual and small shareholders, with shareholders that able to obtain important company 
information such as institutional shareholders and shareholders who are also takecontrol of 
company management. 
suggestions
The results of this result showed unexpected effects on ownership structures and capital 
structures toward the company value. Such relationship may occur due to the incompleteness 
of public’s information on related company, resulting vary perceptions or negative allegations 
towards shareholders who have authority in company and to shareholders who have the 
dominant power in the company. Thus, it is necessary to improve information disclosure so 
that all shareholders and communities have the same information with shareholders who are 
also part of the management, and with the institutional shareholders who have a team and a 
level of ability to dig and analyze information sharper.
Meanwhile, for society and and prospective investors who have concerns about the 
managerial ownership intervention and institutional ownership that will only benefit themselves, 
but do not benefit small investors as well as community, the community and prospective investors 
can choose a more trusted alternative investment and investment management entrusted to the 
experts, such as with investments in the form of mutual funds.
research limitation and Future research agenda 
The limitation of this research is only researching companies that are in the 
manufacturing sector, so in the future research, the object research can be expanded by 
involving other sectors, also comparing market trends in each sector. This research also 
makes debt policy indicators and capital ownership in the form of ratios, while the research 
results is strengthening the fact that managerial ownership, institutional ownership and 
debt financing policies is still needed by the company and can be stimulants to increase 
company value, at some level. While the high composition or ratio will harm the company 
in the end. Thus, in the future research, it is expected to develop more precise measuring 
instrument where it is not good if the ratio is too low or too high, so that the best is ratio 
with a certain limit.
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